Abstract

Consciousness is discussed using a conceptual space in which physical and intentional operations are equally natural and interdependent. David Chalmers defined “the hard problem of consciousness” as explaining the subjective aspect of consciousness, which he claimed to be functionless. However, it would be useless for analysts to make unconscious contents conscious were that so. Observations confirming that consciousness has physical effects are touched upon. Two reasons Chalmers’ problem is hard are the fundamental abstraction of physical science and the dualistic conceptual space typically employed. Criticisms of introspection as a method are discussed. Qualia are shown to be a red herring. Understanding consciousness requires understanding what it produces-knowledge as acquaintance. The intentional nature of knowledge and its relation to physical information are discussed. I show how intentional operations can transform physical information into conscious contents.

Keywords:Consciousness; Semiology; Intentionality; Mind-body problem