Is Objective Hermeneutics a Suitable Method for Psychoanalytic Research? Methological and Constitutional Theory Considerations with Special Reference to the Problem of Probation

The crisis of psychoanalysis as a science

Since its beginnings, psychoanalysis has been confronted with the accusation that it is not a science. According to its own claim, it is both: on the one hand a practice, one offering treatment, and on the other a science. And the two are interrelated, or more precisely, science serves as a foundation for practice, so that practice can claim to be professional1. While Freud repeatedly reflected on methodological questions in relation to psychoanalytic practice [1-5], he hardly ever commented on such questions in relation to psychoanalysis as a science. If, contrary to the criticism that Freud’s work is not scientific, we assume that it represents an important contribution to science, we can ask what his - not explicit, but implicit methodology consists of. Roughly speaking, it can then be stated that Freud worked empirically, gaining his data from his own treatment practice or from the literature, which he processed casuistically, i.e. treated as individual cases from which he inductively drew general or theoretical conclusions. In doing so, he proceeded hermeneutically - but without explaining and justifying why and in what way. Recently, the vehemence with which psychoanalysis as a science (and thus indirectly as a practice, as a professional practice) has been called into question has intensified. The idea that only research that uses quantitative methods can rightly claim to be scientific has gained power and influence to such an extent that research that uses other methods, i.e. qualitative methods, has come under enormous pressure to justify itself. In other words, psychoanalytic research is increasingly faced with the challenge of explaining its methodological approach in detail; indeed, it will only be able to assert itself in the face of the criticism to which it is exposed if it enters into the discourse on methodological issues.

The fundamental premise of psychoanalysis is that there is an unconscious. Of course, it is obvious that this unconscious cannot be/become the subject of science directly, but is at best mediated, i.e. on the basis of objectifications, of traces that it has left behind in the data material. The unconscious leaves its traces not only, but above all, in the medium of language. Linguistic utterances, if they are available in writing or as transcripts, can of course also be investigated using quantitative research methods - factors are operationalized so that correlations between them can be calculated-but nothing is gained if the correlations established in this way are not also interpreted. Yes, it is the interpretation of the correlations that is ultimately important, and qualitative, or more precisely, hermeneutic methods are required to arrive at such an interpretation. And this is particularly true when it comes to contexts of meaning the creation of which was influenced by the unconscious.

The challenge of substantiating the scientific claim of psychoanalysis was taken up some time ago by a number of researchers. One example of this is a publication by Leuzinger et al. [5]. In this publication, the authors distinguish between clinical and extra clinical research, whereby the former is regarded as “the core of psychoanalytic research” (ibid., 39), in which “critical hermeneutics” is applied. For the latter, i.e. for extra clinical research, a number of approaches are presented, whereby it either remains unclear how these each proceed methodically -e.g. the research referred to as “conceptual research” - or recourse is more or less made to quantitative methods. However, the question arises as to whether (the former) clinical research can be regarded as scientific at all and not instead as a systematic reflection that owes its orientation to the professional ethical ideal of doing maximum justice to each individual case [6], and whether it makes sense to rely so much on quantitative methods in (the latter,) extra-clinical research, as the authors do, and to tend to neglect qualitative methods. Against the background of the distinction between psychoanalysis as a practice and as a science2, the following will present and justify the proposal to consistently place the latter, i.e. psychoanalytic research, “on a hermeneutic footing”. More precisely, the question of whether the method of objective hermeneutics developed by the social psychologist Ulrich Oevermann can be used for psychoanalytic research will be investigated, and it will be explained how this can be done.

The method of objective hermeneutics and the model of practice

Objective hermeneutics is closely linked to considerations of constitutional theory, i.e. considerations relating to the subject matter of sociology and social psychology, i.e. human action. This action is understood as a practice, i.e. as a unit that makes decisions and which can be identical with an individual subject, but which can also consist of several people who decide together3. This practice takes place-as the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu [7] also sees it -on the one hand on the basis of structures and is shaped by them, while on the other hand structures can also be created by them, so that something new emerges. From a philosophical point of view, there seems to be a certain proximity to existential philosophy here, insofar as it is assumed that every practice is capable of making decisions. However, in contrast to existential philosophy, such as that of Jean Paul Sartre [8], according to which decisions are made in situations that are in principle characterized by freedom, here we do not speak of freedom in the abstract, but of a distinct number of possibilities for action that can be determined in concrete terms. Freedom is not absolute, because certain structures are present in every situation, from which very specific options for action arise. These structures make up everything that is understood in sociology as “the social” and this - a point of central importance for a structuralist sociology - is given before every single decision [9].

Although these structures, which are given before every decision, are decisive for the options that open up for a practice in a certain situation, they do not determine its decision. The practice also does not “choose” absolutely freely but makes a decision in the face of concretely available options - and this alone is its “freedom”. The question now is how this choice is made. In other words: how does a particular decision come about? Objective hermeneutics, as a sequence analysis, is a method that claims to do justice to this model of practice - initially only outlined in broad strokes [10,11]: it aims to reconstruct the connection between opening and closing in the course of action or in a process of practice - in a way that is detached from action - i.e. on the one hand to explicate all those options that open up in a given situation and on the other hand to determine the decision that appears as a choice or selection of an option from the set of given options. It then becomes apparent that not only does each decision open up new options, i.e. possibilities for connection, but that above all in the sequence of several decisions it becomes clear that these are not made at random, but are connected, that they follow a certain “logic”. Each individual decision creates something new and the sequence of decisions ultimately forms a new structure. The analysis of the sequence of decisions of a practice, which is examined from a certain theoretical perspective as a “case”, leads to the determination of a “case structure”. In other words, to take up the comparison with existential philosophy once again, while existential philosophy uses the terms “existence” and “essence” and - as already mentioned - assumes an abstract concept of freedom, here we are not only talking about concrete possibilities for action that open up on the basis of structures given in advance, but also - instead of an essence or a being - about a case structure that results from the sequence of decisions in practice and that can be reconstructed in retrospect.

Crises and the question of their resolution through decisions

So, the question is, how is a decision made that represents a choice from a range of possible actions? In order to answer this, a difference/distinction that is fundamental to practice must be taken into account, namely that between two types of situations, namely on the one hand those in which no decision is ultimately required, i.e. situations in which action is determined by routines, and on the other hand those in which a decision must actually be made - for which, in turn, it is not possible not to decide [12]. These are situations in which routines cannot be continued. For their part, routines are structures that form the basis of a practice and ensure that it can continue unchanged for a while. They make it possible to simply “carry on as before”, a continuity that is of enormous importance for everyday life. But - as I stated earlier - this continuity cannot be continued in certain situations; there is a discontinuity, a break, in short, a crisis. And then the question of how this crisis can be overcome arises.

The crisis forces a decision, and the question is - as stated - how this decision can be made. On the one hand, this decision is always made in such a way that it appears to make sense for the authority that makes it, i.e. the practice. The practice only makes a decision if it is convinced of it itself - either strongly or only weakly. It will have to justify this decision either to itself or to others. Oevermann therefore speaks of the dialectic of “compulsion to decide” and “obligation to justify”: on the one hand, in a crisis there is a need to make a decision that will solve the crisis; on the other hand, there is a need to “somehow” justify this decision [13]. This “somehow” is admittedly a problem, because ultimately a decision that is made in a future in which routines no longer apply and which is therefore open cannot be justified at all. If a decision could be justified at the moment it is made, then strictly speaking there would be no crisis. Nevertheless, there is a need to justify the decision once it has been made. In relation to an acting subject, this means that they must justify their decision to themselves and to others.

So, the key point is that there is a hiatus when a decision is made at the moment of crisis. One can then ask if this means that such a decision is irrational because it cannot be justified? That would mean that the accusation of decisionism would be justified at this point. But that is not the case: no decision is made arbitrarily, and no decision can simply escape the obligation to give reasons. But whether a decision can be justified, whether it was the right one, is ultimately only revealed in retrospect - and in many cases it can take a very long time before it finally becomes clear what rationality a decision is or was based on. In relation to the subject’s actions, this can be formulated as follows: in retrospect, it is possible to say whether his decision is correct and whether it, i.e. the subject, has stood the test of time. Yes, with every crisis the subject faces a problem of proving itself. It is the subject itself that has to prove itself. And this applies not only to individual crises or decisions, but ultimately to life as a whole. In relation to this, the subject is faced with the question: have I proven myself?

Even if further clarifications have been made in the meantime, the question of how decisions are made in a crisis situation still remains unanswered. In order to come one step closer to an answer, it is important to bear in mind that the crisis situation is associated with radical uncertainty. The knowledge on which the routines are based is no longer valid and a situation of openness and uncertainty has arisen. This means that every option for action that arises on the basis of established structures is associated with doubt: Is the option being considered really the right one? If it really is a crisis, then this question cannot be answered. These doubts can paralyze a practice, can paralyze a subject, can lead to it not making a decision - but ultimately that is also a decision.

In pragmatist philosophy, it has been pointed out that there are a number of methods for dealing with doubts about the correctness of a decision, for “silencing” doubts [14]. If, for example, it takes a while to assess whether a decision will stand the test of time or not, it may be necessary to simply stick to the decision that has been made and not be distracted by doubts. In this context, Charles S. Peirce spoke of the method of perseverance. Another method that Peirce mentions is that of authority. However, it is associated with the fact that the practice or the subject ultimately relinquishes the decision and leaves it to another person or authority. It is listened to because this authority stands in a credible way for something third that is recognized by the subject. This third party is the source from which the authority of the other person or authority is fed [15]. Other methods are the a priori method and the method of science. The latter is out of the question in the case of practical decisions - this would amount to science patronizing practice - but can certainly be used to legitimize decisions. The a priori method, which consists of believing in something before any experience, of being convinced of something on the assumption that it is reasonable, can offer a possible solution. But it is precisely in view of this that the question arises as to whether something fundamentally different is also necessary in order to make a decision, not just a method to silence doubts, but also something that ultimately leads to a decision actually being made. From the perspective of sociology, this is what the concept of charisma stands for..

Max Weber used the concept of charisma in the context of both his sociology of religion and his sociology of domination [16,17]. Ultimately, however, it can be understood as a fundamental concept of sociology regardless of any special field. If we now ask how charisma, without which decisions cannot ultimately be made, comes about, it is helpful to distinguish between self - charisma and external charisma. The example of religious or political charismatics makes it clear that the two are mutually dependent: in both cases, a community or a society is in crisis, searching for a subject who might be able to bring about a solution. In Mass Psychology and Ego Analysis, Freud [18] described how expectations are projected onto a person in such a situation, which, insofar as they are associated with the attribution of special knowledge and ability, can be understood as “external charismatization”. The question is then how the person reacts to these expectations, whether they are confident that they can meet these expectations and, in short, whether they also charismatize themselves.

What is necessary for this can in turn be explained from a different, psychoanalytical perspective. In his reflections on the “mirror stage”, Jacques Lacan explained that the following process is a general one: by perceiving itself in a mirror, more abstractly formulated, in another person (or even several persons), more precisely, by being perceived by others, the subject experiences itself as a whole, becomes an ego that can conceive of itself as capable of acting [19,20]. In a crisis situation, something similar can happen. Here, expectations are projected onto a person by society and this person - mirroring themselves in their counterpart - reacts by accepting the expectations, believing themselves capable of meeting them. In short, they charismatize themselves4. This can now also be applied to individual crises. Regardless of whether or not a subject is exposed to the expectations of others in such crises, self - charismatization is required in order to reach a decision.

The influence of the unconscious using the example of a mistake

There are therefore several factors that play a role in the formation of a decision. A further factor is that it is not uncommon for people to say that decisions are made intuitively, in line with everyday understanding. People are then said to have been guided by their feelings. This pre-scientific understanding can be replaced by a scientific one with reference to psychoanalysis, whereby from the point of view of the latter, the unconscious plays a not insignificant role in the making of decisions. Freud used various examples and materials to empirically demonstrate the role of the unconscious. Empirical here means on the basis of expressions that can be interpreted as symptoms. It has already been noted that language plays a special role as an expressive material, which is explained by the fact that language can be both the material in which something is expressed and the medium in which this material is interpreted. If something is expressed in a different material, for example in a posture such as in a sculpture - Freud’s interpretation of Michelangelo’s Moses is a good example [21] - a translation, i.e. a transformation into language or a text, must first be carried out, which can then be made the subject of a scientifically verifiable analysis.

One particular type of linguistic utterance that Freud systematically investigated in order to detect traces of the unconscious includes misperformances [22]. Against the background of the considerations of Austin JL [23] & Searle JR [24], these can be understood as a special category of speech act, i.e. ultimately as a particular form of practice. Speech act theory has pointed out that every linguistic utterance is an action that consists of an illocutionary act on the one hand and has a propositional content on the other (whereby it is possible that the former changes but the latter remains the same. Then, for example, the meaning of the speech act “I assert that x is a p” is different from that of “I ask whether x is a p”).

The decisive premise on which Freud’s hermeneutics of false performances is based is that he fundamentally ascribes meaning to them. His thesis is that mistakes arise because the speaker has two different intentions, one of which is to be expressed, but the other is to remain suppressed and yet emerge. In the Lectures on the Introduction to Psychoanalysis, Freud [25] uses the following example: “I urge you to raise a burp to the well-being of our boss” (Ich fordere Sie auf, auf das Wohl unseres Chefs aufzustoßen) (Ibid., p. 57). One intention is to make a “toast” to the boss, the other, the suppressed intention, is expressed explicitly and by mistake through the use of the German verb “aufzustoßen” meaning literally “to burp,” instead of the correct form for a toast which is “anzustoßen,”. The latter reflects the act of clinking glasses together in a toast but the form used in Freud’s example underlines an unfortunate slip of the tongue. Something has penetrated the conscious, controlled speech, has left its mark. It is not a meaningless slip of the tongue, but a valid form of expression that refers to the unconscious, to a conflict between what is officially required - the toast to the boss - and what is expressed as an unconscious wish, the wish – very generally formulated - to articulate a feeling of discomfort.

If an attempt is now made to analyze this speech act using the method of objective hermeneutics, it does indeed lead to a very similar result. However, the analysis is carried out according to proven rules of the method and is correspondingly transparent and verifiable [11,26]. One of these rules’ states that the material, the text, is to be broken down into individual sequences and interpreted linearly. The first sequence then reads: “I request you,”. This sequence is the illocutionary act of the speech act, namely, what is done with it. This act consists of a request that the speaker, who is linguistically represented by the personal pronoun of the 1st person singular, addresses to a quantitatively indeterminate number of addressees (“you”). If one also takes into account that the set of addressees is not addressed with the personal pronoun of the 2^nd person plural, but that of the 3^rd person plural, it becomes clear that the speaker has a formal, not an informal, personal relationship with the addressees.

With his speech act, the speaker now places himself in the elevated position of someone who expects others to do something specific. This raises the question of how the speaker got into this position and what characterizes it. Is it associated with the power to force those addressed to comply with the request, or is the position inherently contradictory, is the speaker elevated but at the same time on the same level as those addressed, so that they are free to listen to the speaker or not? And with what legitimacy does the speaker address the recipients? In short, the question arises as to the social constellation in which the speech act is carried out.

“[T]o burp the well-being of our boss.” This is the propositional content of the speech act. It becomes clear in relation to the social constellation that the speaker is part of a community, speaking on behalf of a “we”. There is also a hierarchy, a difference between a “chief” and those who are subordinate to him, his employees, to whom the speaker also belongs. In terms of content, it is about the well-being of the boss. But what about the good of the boss? At this point, a problem arises because the verb “aufstoßen” does not fit with the rest of the sequence. If you ask yourself which verb would fit here, or more precisely, which verb would be the right one according to the rules of the language, only one comes into mind, namely “to toast”.5 Toasting someone is a ritual that expresses the wish that this person be well. It is performed at a birthday party, for example, where a toast is made with sparkling wine (or similar) to the well-being of the “birthday child”. It can therefore be assumed that such a festive situation exists here.

However, the analysis must not stop at this point. It is not enough to record how the formulation should read correctly, i.e. according to the applicable rules. Objective hermeneutics assumes - like Freud - that what is said has a meaning and can be understood. In order to determine this, it is necessary to follow another rule of objective hermeneutics, the principle of literalness. It would contradict this principle to claim that the speaker simply made a mistake, and wanted to say something else or meant something else. It is not what could have been meant that is relevant, but only what is/was actually said. And that is “burp”. But how is that to be understood?

The trace of the unconscious

Objective hermeneutics not only stipulates that texts or protocols are interpreted sequentially, linearly and according to the principle of literalness, but also that the given context is initially disregarded. With regard to the present sequence or the given verb “aufstoßen”, the question is what it can mean under different pragmatic conditions. One condition could be, for example, that someone runs into a door with momentum and “pushes” it opens in this way. In this case, pushing open means opening something with vigor, possibly even with force. Another pragmatic context would be a straggler who has made a special effort to catch up with his group on a hike and is now “pushing open” again. Bumping into is then synonymous with someone joining a group of people. Are other pragmatic fulfilment conditions of “bumping into” conceivable? According to the principle of extensivity, all conceivable readings should be spelled out as far as possible. At least one is still possible: someone has eaten too much or something that is difficult to digest, or they feel nauseous for some other reason so that they have to “burp up”. Burping here means discomfort, a physical discomfort caused by air or something else coming up from the stomach. When the mouth is open, this can occur noisily and is then referred to as burping. This in turn is considered rude and indecent towards others, in short, it is a form of non-conformity.

Which reading is the correct one? Only the latter can be fitted into the actual context and is compatible with it. It is therefore the one offered here. And that means that the sentence as a whole is the result of a combination of two different speech acts. One speech act is the toast to the boss. And the other? It is incomplete and can be completed in different ways, e.g. in such a way that it reads: “I have to burp6.” However, since it does not say “I have to burp”, but only “burp”, the question arises as to who is actually behind the speech act; who or what is speaking with it. While the speaker makes himself known in the first speech act, he is not represented linguistically in the second speech act. Something else speaks, something different from the speaker. From the perspective of psychoanalysis, it is the unconscious that speaks here. Is this interpretation hypothesis plausible?

Against the background of what was said above about making a decision, the thesis that it is the unconscious that has left its mark on the speaker’s words can certainly be made plausible: the speaker has fallen into a certain crisis as a result of being asked to make a toast to the boss in front of a crowd of employees. On the one hand, he accepts this assignment and does what is expected of him-routinely. On the other hand, however, there is something inside him that resists, that rebels. However, the latter cannot be expressed openly, as it contradicts what is expected of him, i.e. the expectations of conformity that emanate from others, but which he also shares himself. But he feels uncomfortable. It is difficult to say what causes this discomfort. It may have to do with the speaker himself, with the fact that he is reluctant to put himself in a prominent position, whether with the boss with whom he does not have a good relationship, with the situation in which not only he but also those being addressed find themselves, and so on [27]. Be that as it may, the decisive factor is that the discomfort remains unconscious as something repressed but demands expression and thus leaves its mark on what is said in a scandalous and at the same time inconspicuous way - only the suffix has been replaced.

Crises and the problem of probation

With regard to the question of how decisions come about, one more aspect needs to be added, indeed, it could or even should have been considered earlier: that of interpretation. The crisis into which a practice has fallen requires interpretation, in several respects, both retrospectively - how did it come about? - as well as prospectively: how is a solution possible? It has already been mentioned above that the problem of probation becomes virulent in a crisis. It arises in relation to each individual decision - will it stand the test or not? – as well as in relation to a subject who makes a large number of decisions in the course of their life: have they succeeded in giving their life meaning, have they ultimately proven themselves through their entire way of life?

Traditionally, religions have offered the subject an interpretative framework with the help of which they could interpret crises, develop solutions that offer a way out of them and give meaning to their lives overall. In view of the fact that the problem of proving oneself naturally continues to exist under the conditions of secularization, Oevermann has proposed the concept of the “proving myth”, which includes both religious and secular variants. In his sociology of religion, Max Weber took the example of natural disasters that suddenly, i.e. completely unexpectedly, befall a community [16]. In his writings on the sociology of religion, Oevermann refers to death, which every person is inevitably confronted with, which often occurs completely unexpectedly, and that leads to an abrupt break in communication and leaves the bereaved helpless [28]. Generally speaking, it is crises in which an individual subject or a community finds itself and which cannot be explained causally that have in the past led to the construction of the idea of a “back world” in which powers and forces are imagined to which the crisis could be attributed as acting authorities and which ultimately have always been or continue to be thought of in analogy to members of one’s own sociality. In his work “The Future of an Illusion”, Freud [29] took up a variant of how a transcendent entity can be conceptually constructed as a father. However, he was well aware that this is only one possibility among several and that the construction can also turn out quite differently [30]. It can also be said that people’s relationship to the transcendent entity that Freud mentions in this essay, namely the wish for this entity to provide protection - as parents did in childhood - is (also) only one of several possible ones.

How the powers in the “Hinterwelt” and how people’s relationships with them are conceived is manifested in practice, both in the practice of religious experts and in that of the laity. Weber distinguished three religious experts: the sorcerer, the priest and the prophet, in terms of their respective practices, i.e. the way in which they perceive their responsibility for communicating with the “Hinterwelt” [31]. More generally, prayer can be understood as the practice by which a community or an individual in a situation of need turns in supplication to an entity conceived as transcendent, to which a power beyond human capacity is attributed [32]. The conceptual construction of an entity (or even several entities) conceived as transcendent has enormous consequences: on a cognitive level, it means that the life of the individual and the community can be interpreted in such a way that elementary, indeed universal questions can be answered: “Where do we come from? Who are we? And where are we going?” In addition, the practice is brought into a reciprocal relationship with this authority: when the individual or the community turns to it with requests, the question arises as to what they will provide in return for their fulfilment. Last but not least, the relationship with this authority also has an emotional or psychological dimension.

With regard to the question that was the starting point and that has been taken up again several times, the following can now be said in conclusion: the hiatus that arises at the moment of crisis can only be overcome and a decision made if not only a method is available to silence doubts and a certainty based on charismatization is available, but also if an interpretation, or more precisely, an interpretative framework exists. In the past, religions offered this by answering the three questions mentioned above and providing the community and the individual with criteria for how it is possible to prove oneself. In the process of secularization, however, religions have lost their power of persuasion7. However, this does not mean that the problem of proving oneself has disappeared. On the contrary, this problem has become even more acute, for the individual subject is now called upon to answer the three questions independently, i.e. to create an individual myth of probation – and to do so as consistently as possible so that he or she can understand his or her life as meaningful and fulfilled.

Based on the accusation that psychoanalysis is not scientific, the question of whether and to what extent the method of objective hermeneutics is suitable to counter this accusation and guarantee the scientific nature of psychoanalytic research was investigated. To this end, with reference to a complex model of practice, at the center of which is the question of the conditions of the possibility of decisions, an attempt was first made to determine at what point and in what way the great discovery of Freud becomes significant, namely, the unconscious. Using an example from Freud, an example of a mistake, it was then shown how the unconscious can influence decisions and be expressed in speech acts, among other things. It was shown how traces of the unconscious (which can be expressed in different materials) can be reconstructed with the help of objective hermeneutics, using protocols that are broken down into sequences and then interpreted linearly, extensively and sparingly, initially context-free, but then contextualized [33].

Based on the difference between psychoanalysis as a practice on the one hand and as a science on the other, two variants of understanding those traces of the unconscious can now be distinguished from one another, one practical and one scientific [34]. In the context of the practice of psychoanalysis, the traces of the unconscious are opened up by analyzing transference and countertransference [35]. This understanding takes place on the basis of a working alliance that is characterized by both a specific, role-based relationship and a diffuse social relationship. The abstinence rule is of central importance for specificity, while the invitation to free association is of central importance for diffuseness. In contrast, for scientific understanding it is necessary to bring the “object” to a distance, to analyze it in such a way that the results of the analysis are intersubjectively verifiable. In objective hermeneutics, the rules of method mentioned above serve this purpose. With their help, the validity claims associated with the results that psychoanalysis arrives at in practice can be verified scientifically, i.e. in a methodologically controlled and action-relieved manner.

If, for example, protocols of treatment processes are prepared, objective hermeneutics can be used to scientifically examine not only the statements of patients that are found in them, but also those of analysts [36]. In relation to both, it can then be asked whether traces of the unconscious can be found in them. Psychoanalytic practice can be examined as a communicative practice from various perspectives. One issue in particular should be emphasized here: the utterances of analysts are those of professionals who make them in the course of their professional activities. In other words, the (verbal) actions of psychoanalysts are based on a scientific foundation, i.e. on various theories, above all on a theory of the psyche and its development, but also on a theory of psychoanalytic practice and the working alliance. Last but not least, it is also based on theoretical assumptions with regard to the problem of probation. Is it assumed that it exists? Is the patient’s probation myth – whether religious or secular - included in the treatment? If so, how?

All these theories implicit in the actions of psychoanalysts can be described as first-degree theories [37]. Second-degree theories can be distinguished from these and are articulated when psychoanalysts talk about their own practice or about psychoanalytic practice in general8. Of course, second-degree theories cannot be reconstructed on the basis of protocols of psychoanalytic practice, but they can be reconstructed with the help of interviews. Third-degree theories, on the other hand, are scientific theories that rely either on protocols of psychoanalytic practice and attempt to grasp them theoretically, or on interviews with psychoanalysts. While such theories are developed by science, they can in turn be helpful for practice, namely when they are received and reflected upon in the process of professionalization, which is ultimately never complete.

As far as the problem of probation is concerned, it is ultimately hard to imagine that it does not play a role in psychoanalytic practice. The problem of probation poses a particular challenge for psychoanalytic practice when traditional ways of solving it, i.e. religious forms, come up and the patient is a Muslim, for example. To ignore it would be unprofessional, as would simply dismissing it as infantile. It is much more important to understand the significance of the problem for the patient. Whether he then remains religious or not is his decision.