Islamic Anti-Semitism as a Narcissistic Phenomenon. Reflections on a Current Topic Following Béla Grunberger and Pierre Dessuant

The state of research on anti-Semitism is now almost impossible to keep track of. Numerous studies have been carried out from different theoretical perspectives and are more or less empirically based. Psychoanalytic research is prominent among these studies [1], but one approach, although it has been available since 19971, has so far received little attention, namely the study of anti-Semitism “on the guideline of narcissism” (12) by Béla Grunberger and Pierre Dessuant [2]. This will be discussed below because it makes it possible to focus on a specific variant of anti-Semitism that has recently received a great deal of public attention, but has rarely been empirically investigated and theoretically reflected upon: Islamic anti- Semitism.

Although the theoretical premises on which the work of Grunberger and Dessuant are based are psychoanalytical, they differ significantly from those of Sigmund Freud. While the concept of guilt and Freud’s theory of Oedipal development are of central importance to Freud’s analysis of anti-Semitism, which can be found primarily in his late work “The Man Moses and the Monotheistic Religion” [3], Grunberger and Dessuant focus on the concept of narcissism. Freud had already reflected on this theoretically in his 1914 essay on narcissism [4], distinguishing between “primary narcissism”, a love that is not directed towards another “object”, towards a counterpart and is also not mediated by one, but is aimed directly at one’s own self. Freud also refers to this as “auto-erotism”. He distinguishes it from “secondary narcissism”, which is mediated by another person, another “object”: the love is not reciprocated by this person and does not meet with a positive response. And out of disappointment, or so that the ego does not “go away empty-handed”, it withdraws its libido from the object and turns it back on itself.

With regard to secondary narcissism, Grunberger and Dessuant add at this point that turning to an object is linked to the desire to be reflected in it, or more precisely, to see the ideal of oneself reflected in it. Confirmation is sought for this ideal image; indeed, the other person is expected to provide it. However, if the ego realizes that reality does not correspond to the ideal, it can happen that the difference, i.e. that which does not match the ideal, is split off and projected onto others, or more precisely: reproached. It is precisely this projective process that underlies anti-Semitism.

Narcissism and aggression in the intrauterine state

What is special about the theory of narcissism, which forms the basis for Grunberger and Dessuant’s analysis of anti-Semitism, is that the two authors start from an even earlier stage of narcissism than Freud, from narcissism in a prenatal stage. In this stage, there is a self-love that is not clouded by any difference, a feeling of unity with everything that surrounds the developing life. No discord, no dissonance disturbs this harmony, it is a feeling of elation, of boundless euphoria. With birth, however, everything changes, this state of boundless happiness is irretrievably lost-and a longing arises that can become virulent and tangible again and again from then on: the longing to return to a paradisiacal state of bliss.

The two authors supplement their theoretical premises with the assertion that in the intrauterine stage the fetus not only feels-narcissistically-the happiness of an unclouded unity with itself and the surrounding world, but also-in contrast to this-an aggressiveness. This expresses itself in this early stage as “parasitic orality” (47), when the fetus feeds-orally-on its environment. This affect also changes after birth. Indeed, birth is “the prototype of the narcissistic wound” (48), the experience of separation, of being rejected-and this can lead to aggression.

According to Grunberger and Dessuant, both narcissism and aggressiveness are already present before birth and change after birth – and it then depends on how they are integrated into the subject’s “ego structure” (49) or interwoven with oedipal development. Grunberger and Dessuant are convinced that these theoretical premises are particularly suitable for understanding anti-Semitism, indeed they offer a “hermeneutical key” for it. But not only that: they also enable an understanding of some facets of religiosity. For example, the primary, intrauterine narcissism, the “elation” of unity with the surrounding world, can be seen as the root or experiential basis of what is conceptualized with words such as “bliss”, “eternity”, or “divinity”. The idea of omnipotence can also be traced back to this experience. And the longing that arises after birth for a return to the state of “high spirits” is the basis for the longing to regain the lost paradise, as it is conceived in the monotheistic religions.

Oedipality and narcissism in Judaism and Christianity

At this point, I would like to add a few remarks from the perspective of a theory of intersubjectivity: the idea of a God requires a relationship of intersubjectivity, namely between the believing subject and his God. In other words: Ego gets into a relationship with an alter, an alter that is not real but solely imagined. In view of this, the idea of communication is possible in two directions: on the one hand, the idea that the one God speaks to the believing subject, for example via an intermediary figure, the prophet, in the sense of a “revelation”. On the other hand, the believing subject can turn to his God, can speak to him in the mode of prayer.

Of course, this intersubjective relationship also has a psychological dimension. From a psychoanalytical perspective, the question arises as to which experience, which model the believing subject uses to shape the relationship with the other person, who is conceived of as transcendent. Through which experience with which “object” is this relationship shaped? In relation to the monotheistic religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, it is primarily the relationship with the Father that is used to model the relationship with the one God, who is seen as transcendent. With regard to Judaism and Christianity, Grunberger and Dessuant see a fundamental difference here: in Judaism, the one God is not only conceived as a counterpart, but also remains as such for the believing subject. And the relationship between the two is an Oedipal one. In Christianity, on the other hand, the difference disappears, the subject merges with the divine entity, so that the relationship can no longer be an Oedipal one, but rather tends to become a narcissistic one. In addition, there is a different relationship to reality in each case: in Judaism, concrete life, everyday life is reflected religiously, i.e. practical everyday questions are answered with reference to a multitude of norms and laws. In this way, everyday life is sanctified. In Christianity, on the other hand, the identification of man with God has created an opposition between spirit and matter, which ultimately leads to the material being devalued.

The Oedipal character of the relationship between God and man in Judaism is illustrated by the authors with brief remarks on the history of the people of Israel: their captivity in Egypt can be interpreted symbolically as a unity with their mother, from which their father-Moses-led them out. The quarrel with the one God, culminating in the story of the “Golden Calf”, was then an expression of an Oedipal conflict. This led to a period of latency, the time of wandering in the desert for 40 years. And finally, at the end, the laws were recognized and obeyed – more or less consistently in practice.

As far as Christianity is concerned, Grunberger and Dessuant go into detail about Jesus, his biography, his person, as well as his words and deeds. Their central thesis is that Jesus was a narcissist. The authors make this thesis plausible by assuming that Jesus did not have a “real father” (86). This deficit was compensated for by the idea of a divine father. However, Jesus did not enter into an Oedipal conflict with this father, especially as he radically repressed his sexuality during puberty. Rather, he had developed the-regressive-idea of a fusion with the divine father. In order to quell the doubts that arose in him about his own divinity, Jesus sought out people who absolutely believed in him. They became his “disciples” and mirrored his ideal, the narcissistic idea of his divinity. On the other hand, however, the doubts were awakened, nourished or reinforced by those who did not believe in his divinity. They, the doubters, were reacted to with aggression. As Christianity became increasingly independent, “the Jews” became the bearers of this doubt. They were also identified with the “paternal principle”, “the Jew [became] the representative of the law” and Judaism was criticized on the basis of the juxtaposition of law and faith or grace.

Islamic anti-Semitism seen from a historical perspective

And what about Islam? The focus of Grunberger and Dessuant’s explanations is on Christianity, as they are primarily concerned with the roots of anti-Semitism in Christianity. The two authors only deal with Islam in passing, on a few pages. There they deal with Islamic anti-Semitism primarily from a historical perspective: they begin by talking about the Koran, explaining that it contains borrowings from both Jewish and Christian sources, from the former significantly more than from the latter. Mention is made above all of strict monotheism, which was “softened” by the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, as well as “the Mosaic law” (297), which was relativized in Christianity by the aforementioned opposition of law and faith.

In a second step, the two authors ask about the relationship between Muslims and Jews in the history of Islam, specifically whether violence was exercised against Jews. In the context of Islamic expansion, a “holy war” was waged, but it was directed solely against polytheists. It was only in connection with the Crusades that the holy war was also directed against Christians. Otherwise, over the centuries, there had been repeated outbreaks of violence against Jews and Christians, who had the status of dhimmis, or wards, within Islamic societies. These outbreaks of violence were to be seen in the context of social crises and had no “theoretical (and theological) justification” (298).

As far as the position of Jews in Islamic society is concerned, it can be added that this was marginal [5]: Jews had to pay a poll tax and were able to practise their religion relatively freely in return. [6] They were despised, even humiliated in some casesbut not hated and ostracized as in European societies shaped by Christianity [7,8].

In the 20th century, modern Islamic anti-Semitism finally emerged, directed against Zionism and the state of Israel, which was founded in 1948. In the background was the traditional division of the world into a “house of Islam” and a “house of war”, i.e. those parts of the world with which Muslims were either at war or with which there was a ceasefire-and Palestine was seen as belonging to the “house of Islam”. However, the reception of modern European anti- Semitism, especially the ideology of German National Socialism, which was combined with an extremely selective reading of the Koran and the hadith, was of decisive importance for the emergence of modern Islamic anti-Semitism2. Grunberger and Dessuant see the result of this synthesis in an “Islamization of anti-Israelism” (299), which could be linked to the idea of holy war. But how can modern Islamic anti-Semitism be explained psychoanalytically?

Guilt and narcissism in Judaism and Islam

It has already been noted that Grunberger and Dessuant only comment on Islamic anti-Semitism in passing and that their explanations are primarily historical. A psychoanalytical interpretation of Islamic anti-Semitism is only hinted at. It may have played a role that the authors hardly had any psychoanalytical interpretations of Islam at their disposal on which they could have based their work3, let alone such interpretations of Islamic anti-Semitism. Freud’s few comments on Islam can be found in his study “The Man Moses and the Monotheistic Religion” [2]. The interpretation of Judaism and the history of the people of Israel developed there is based on Freud’s theory of Oedipal development and has already been outlined above. One aspect that is important to add is that Freud assumed that Moses had been murdered by the Israelites. This could be seen as repeating the murder of the “forefather” [14] and the reason for a feeling of guilt, which ultimately caused the belief in the one God to be anchored within the subjects. However, there was no comparable event, a murder of Mohammed. Therefore, there is no reason for Muslims to have a profound sense of guilt [15]. In other words: On the one hand, the murder of Moses was a step towards independence, towards autonomy; on the other hand, it necessitated an internalization of the “law” that Moses had imparted to the Jews. In Islam, this step towards autonomy does not take place, and conformity with the law is based on an obligation to obey [16].

If a theory of narcissism is used to explain Islamic anti- Semitism, it is worth referring once again to Freud’s comments on Islam. Freud says that the monotheism proclaimed by Muhammad brought about “an extraordinary elevation of self-consciousness” [3]. This can be explained by the fact that the idea of the one God, who is deemed to be unique and omnipotent, fundamentally places the individual-purely mentally in a relationship with a counterpart, and they can then perceive themselves in this counterpart, even mirror themselves4. This effect is heightened when the imagined relationship is conceived of in such a way that the individual is given an elevated position by the one God, i.e. when a difference between him and all other people is conceived, in short, when the idea of chosenness is introduced.

It is remarkable that Freud does not think of this idea as belonging solely to Judaism, but rather also associates it with Islam. From this we can conclude that the idea of chosenness is one that can be fundamentally linked to monotheism-and which of course leads to an increased “elevation of self-consciousness”. There is therefore a fundamental narcissistic potential in the belief in one God.

The negation of reciprocity and obedience

For the relationship between the individual and the one God, something is also relevant that has not yet been considered: the moment of reciprocity. To be more precise, the relationship between God and man (like every social relationship) is also conceived of as reciprocal - which means that man is presented as responsible for his actions and accountable. In Judaism, this reciprocity is figured in the form of a “covenant”: the flip side of chosenness is the obligation to observe the laws. These are internalized - as described above - in accordance with the Oedipal development (and are - more or less - still followed even if the belief in the one God no longer exists). In Islam, on the other hand, the idea of the omnipotence of God is now thought of so consistently that a relationship of reciprocity is ultimately hardly conceivable. Indeed, the idea that the one God is obliged to do anything is negated and the analogy of the God-human relationship to that between the members of a family is explicitly rejected (Sura 112), which implies that Oedipal development tends to be ruled out here - but the possibility of narcissistic identification remains.

Grunberger and Dessuant state: “Just like the Christian, the Muslim has not realized his >detachment< from God.” (300) This corresponds to what was explained above: an Oedipal development, a struggle with God, a murder of the “father”, which on the one hand leads towards autonomy and on the other evokes a feeling of guilt (which then results in an internalization of paternal norms), is difficult to imagine here. They go on to say: “In identifying with him [God], he [the Muslim] identifies with his own narcissism (the saint) and tends to exclude the material world, that is, to project the instinctual element onto the other, who thus becomes the enemy.” As has already been explained, conformity to the law here is based on obedience, which is internalized not through a sense of guilt, but through the threat of punishment. If there is then an identification with the one God, this can take on a narcissistic character and lead to the emergence of an opposition to the material world and all instincts being split off and projected onto others.

What Grunberger and Dessuant do not see, however, is how Islamic anti-Semitism can ultimately be traced back to the early days of Islam [18]. On the one hand, there is the principle of tolerance in the Koran - which the two authors certainly point out (Sura 109), and this of course also applies to Jews. Moreover, after the hijra, the emigration of Muslims from Mecca to Medina, they are integrated into the umma on the basis of the “community order” [16]7. On the other hand, the Koran allows us to reconstruct how hatred of the Jews emerges sometime after the hijra. This can be traced back to the fact that the initial expectation that the Jews would recognize the Koranic message and follow the Prophet Muhammad was disappointed. Indeed, precisely because the Jews were considered “knowledgeable” and it was assumed that they would know and understand the Koranic message, they were regarded as “hardened” and cursed. The violence that was used against the Jewish tribes living in Medina and the surrounding area at the time can also be attributed to the fact that a crisis of credibility was brewing in view of the lack of military success in the conflict with the Meccans, the further development of which was counteracted by the distribution of spoils. However, the fact that Jews were not only robbed of their property but also expelled, enslaved, and sometimes even killed is also linked to the disappointment that arose when it became clear that the Jews were clinging to their religion - which, it can be assumed, was perceived as a narcissistic insult.

To summarize the above considerations, there are two levels that are relevant: on the one hand, the level of the relationship between the subject and the divine entity conceived as transcendent. On this imaginary level, the subject can reflect its ideal image in such a way that it perceives itself as “chosen”; indeed, if the Oedipal moment is removed, it can even identify narcissistically with the divine entity. On the other level, that of reality, the subject can either see his self-confidence confirmed or experience that reality as not corresponding to his self-confidence or his ideal image. Muhammad had the latter experience when the Jewish tribes living in Medina resisted and so clung on to their religion. As a result, they became victims of hatred and violence.

Ultimately, however, what Freud laconically remarked in a few words was true of Islam for centuries: “Allah showed himself far more grateful to his chosen people than Yahweh did to his own at the time.” [3] For a long time, Islamic societies were extremely successful and the Jewish population maintained its place in these societies on the basis of the dhimmi system. Jews were in a position of inferiority and may have been the victims of violence in times of crisis (although this was not theologically justified), but they remained a self-evident part of society.

In modern times, however, since the confrontation with modern Western societies, Islamic societies have been in crisis [19]. From that point, reality no longer corresponds to the selfimage that was gained on the imaginary level in the relationship between God and mankind. In this crisis-ridden situation, in which Islamism also has its roots, modern Islamic anti-Semitism arises, which is characterized by the fact that the principle of tolerance, which is anchored in the Koran, is completely ignored and the Koran is interpreted extremely selectively: only using those passages from the Koran (and the hadith) which express a negative attitude towards the Jews. The idea that Jews are in a social position of inferiority also lives on in modern Islamic anti-Semitism. This traditional hostility was combined with elements and motifs of European anti-Semitism as early as the second half of the 19th century, a development that continued in the 1930s and 1940s, leading to a synthesis of traditional Islamic anti-Semitism with the anti-Semitism of National Socialist Germany. This synthesis eventually spread widely in the Arab world.

According to Grunberger and Dessuant, modern Islamic anti- Semitism can therefore be psychoanalytically traced back to a narcissistic identification with the one God. In this identification, there is no longer a divine counterpart; there is no room here for Oedipal development, for the development of a sense of guilt or for the development of doubts. It not only creates the feeling of being empowered, but it is also associated with absolute certainty. Whatever does not fit with this “pure” narcissism, whatever is not compatible with this imagined pure identity, this pure spirituality, is projected onto “the Jew”. The Jew is therefore constructed as the enemy of Islam, bent on its destruction, as the incarnation of doubt, as a libidinous being and as the epitome of modernity [20]. Just as the National Socialists claimed that the Jews were to blame for all hardship, all misery, and held the view that their extermination was a necessary act of self-defense as the Jews themselves intended to destroy the German people, the Hamas charter, for example, also holds the Jews responsible for everything that is considered negative, for all revolutions in modern times, for all wars Formulated in psychoanalytic terms, by linking Islamic anti-Semitism with conspiracy theories adopted from European anti-Semitism, it takes on a paranoid character. From this “logic”, October 7, 2023, also appears to be an act of self-defense.

The starting point was the question of whether and to what extent Grunberger and Dessuant’s narcissism theory approach can be used to understand Islamic anti-Semitis. It turned out that this is indeed the case: Grunberger and Dessuant are primarily concerned with the roots of modern anti-Semitism in Christianity, and only incidentally do they also comment on Islamic anti-Semitism.

However, the fact that it was also possible to draw on some of Freud’s considerations, to add to the historical explanations provided by the two authors and, following Grunberger and Dessuant, to take a comparative look at the three monotheistic religions - both from the perspective of Oedipal development and the development of narcissism - the result is an insightful psychoanalytical interpretation of Islamic anti-Semitism.

Against the background of this interpretation, the Hamas massacre on October 7, 2023 (for the explanation of which, of course, further factors would have to be taken into account) can also be understood to a certain extent: following Grunberger and Dessuant, it can be proposed that the extreme brutality of this massacre was fed by, on the one hand, the combination of narcissistic identification with the one God and a corresponding self-assurance, with, on the other hand, an abysmal hatred of Jews, whereby Jews are imagined as both inferior and in a position of power.