From Ageing Society to the Pathology of Ageing Society: Thanato-MutationsGesellschaft; Alterwerden-Spaltung and Völkermord-Spaltung

All recent academic work on the issue of ageing is quantitative in nature and highlights the increasing percentage of older people on the planet. Consequently, social sciences, particularly demographers and gerontologists, emphasise the irreversible nature of the ageing society [1-3]. However, it should be noted that quantitative data alone does not necessarily indicate the presences of the ageing society or the increase in the power of the old people. This approach, which is based on a naïve positivist and cause-effect model, should be reconsidered. The recent experience of the Coronavirus pandemic has resulted in restrictions and confinement for old people, thus updating the paradigm of decrepitude under the pretext of hygienic measures. Conversely, as our society ages, this transition is not merely a numerical phenomenon, representing a mere increase in the number of older individuals. It is a more comprehensive offering. This new reality is highly unpredictable in qualitative terms [4-6]. Therefore, in Athens and Sparta, the majority of the population were, in quantitative terms, enslaved, yet no one would have asserted that these societies were slave societies. It was inconceivable. We are confident that one of the major advances of our society is that it makes slavery impossible. However, for the Greeks, slavery was not regarded as a social problem [7,8]. The most notable example is the census taken in 310 BC by the tyrant Demetrius of Phalerius (the son of a slave, it should be noted) in Attica, which recorded a population of 21,000 citizens, 10,000 meticians and 400,000 slaves. For the sake of argument, let us say that the slaves constituted 90% of the total population. This would not, however, be considered a ‘slave-owning society’. It is important to note that numbers do not necessarily reflect social trends, concerns or focal points. Every society creates its own dilemmas. It is important to note that ancient Greece was not the origin of slavery, nor did it express any significant concerns regarding its existence [9-11]. Is it really the 21st century that is inventing an ageing society and complaining about it? Neither of these options is suitable. The concept of ageing as a distinct characteristic emerged during the 19th and 20th centuries, coinciding with the onset of increased life expectancy. This 21st century therefore faces the challenge of addressing the needs of a growing population of older adults, necessitating change, new perspectives and flexibility in our approach. However, it is important to note that this same 21st century is not conducive to an ageing population. It neither recognises it, nor is it aware of it, nor does it have or maintain any capacity to anticipate it [12]. It is clear that the ageing of the population does not represent a major source of entertainment. It may be astonishment or boredom. In our society, the primary focus is on entertainment and the capture of visual information, which encapsulates the disciplining influence of the rectangular screen, otherwise known as the mobile phone and the disciplining power of the networks within it. The pornographic culture of looking without being seen, ‘spying’, ‘scrutinising’ and the ‘voyeurism’ of what others do and how they do it, is a key producer of jouissance in our society. From a psychoanalytical perspective, this can be interpreted as a somewhat unconventional representation of the primal scene. In any event, the ageing population is not a subject that is particularly conducive to concern [13].

Key facts and considerations in the context of an ageing society

The fields of gerontology, demography and public policy have competed for dominance in the study of ageing, treating it as if it were a problem. However, from the perspective of an ageing society, the problem is not socio-health (gerontology), populationrelated (demography) or political (public policies). Each of these three disciplines aims to provide solutions: to improve quality of life, promote the birth rate and redistribute public resources [14,15]. However, despite their best intentions, they have made significant errors in determining that there are ‘problems’ to be solved. The process of ageing is not a problem in itself; rather, it is a new social, economic and cultural reality without precedent. Demography is an inaccurate term in this context, as the process of society ageing does not refer to simple quantitative processes, but rather to qualitatively altered processes, as has previously been demonstrated. Gerontology is also outdated, as it continues to rely on two obsolete paradigms: grandfather-centrism when we should be moving towards great-grandfather-centrism and friendly and pedagogical dissemination when we should be moving towards a contentious and forceful gerontology [16,17]. It is important to note that a methodological, operational and approach error may have been made regarding this issue. A plethora of professionals, including demographers, social workers, psychologists, healthcare professionals and political scientists, have come to the understanding that an ageing society necessitates the engagement and collaboration with older adults. However, this may not be the case [18]. When considering the rupturist and renewed versions of older adults, their emancipatory and empowering capacity suggests that they are likely to generate social experience and identity without the need for external support. It is evident that a state is obliged to acknowledge and uphold the social debt owed to individuals who have contributed through taxation and social security [19,20]. Upon initial observation, the ageing society can be approached through the lens of three key facts: It is predicted that the time it takes for people to die will increase significantly, perhaps as a form of immortality. It is also predicted that there will be a decline in the birth rate and that population growth will cease. And finally, if these predictions are correct, then humanity could face an extinction date. [21-23]. These indicators are the most visible and surface-level, but ageing society implies more: unparalleled and unparalleled change in all spheres of society, including the economy, the urban environment, family structures, architecture, migration and population among others. However, there is a reverse movement: the greater the degree of change (and it is changing), the less public debate about it and the less or no action by governments and states [24]. Demographic changes, the irreversible trend towards longer life expectancies and the relentless fall in births are, for most, merely data and predictions that fail to materialise as a social change called ageing society.

All factors that predict, forecast and indicate an ageing society are in fact separate and unrelated to the ageing society itself [25,26]. It is therefore vital that this issue is given the attention it deserves as our society ages. The ageing population is becoming increasingly invisible in public agendas, social policies and people’s daily lives [27]. In this sense, the ageing society remains a cause for concern. From this point of view, it seems that the minimum social imaginary of the ageing society has not yet been established, thus hindering our ability to fully comprehend its eventual form. This is another perspective on the developments that have occurred in the wake of the pandemic. The delays, errors and unfavourable health decisions that have been made to the disadvantage of older adults suggest that society is not adequately prepared, in terms of cognitive, intuitive or emotional factors, for an ageing population [28,29]. People are not ready, however convincing the data, censuses and statistics may be. However, the current solutions to the challenges posed by an ageing population are limited to delaying specific aspects of life: extending working years and increasing the retirement age. While these solutions may be perceived as misguided, they can provide a sense of reassurance by instilling the belief that action is being taken [30]. The issue of delaying the retirement age should be considered from this perspective. This is a complex issue, because older adults who are compelled to work longer will also be a new type of forced unemployed, due to the prevalence of ageism in the workforce. One potential solution to the issue of age discrimination in the workplace would be to implement a constitutional law that would require companies and the state to reserve a certain percentage of positions in the labour market for older individuals [31-33]. If the ongoing underfunding of pensions is to be regarded as a ‘problem’, it may eventually result in governments being compelled to take the politically challenging step of eliminating pensions altogether. In the absence of employees, the possibility for pension contributions to be made is non-existent. Consequently, in the absence of these contributions, the viability of a pension becomes unfeasible. The central question guiding this inquiry is whether this device suggests its own impossibility. It is imperative that we give full consideration to the implementation of bold and creative solutions in order to address this challenge [34,35]. It is important to acknowledge that there are no ready-made solutions to the challenges posed by an ageing population. In some cases, it will be necessary to be bold; in others, it will be necessary to suggest things that go beyond political correctness. In other cases, solutions will simply be denied, nothing will be done and the unpostponable will be postponed again [36]. The ageing society will therefore experience various forms of societal collapse, violence and upheaval, depending on the awareness that is acquired or the will that is maintained to face its challenges [37].

Psychopathology of the ageing society: Älterwerden- Spaltung and Völkermord-Spaltung

In summary, we are witnessing an ageing society that is simultaneously denying its own ageing. If we analyse it properly, this ignorance is more than just a lack of awareness; it is a social divide that will lead to a significant lack of understanding within society about itself. According to the psychoanalytic perspective, a splitting (spaltung) [38-40]. It is important to note that a high probability indicates that the ageing society will not result in an ageing society, but rather a social pathology that we could tentatively call: Älterwerden-Spaltung (spaltung, ‘splitting’ in German). The consequences of this Alterwerden-Spaltung are as follows: no measures will be taken, ageism will become uncontrollable and nobody and nothing will take care of old people. The situation is further complicated by the fact that today’s adults are choosing not to have children, so these old people of the future, Älterwerden-Spaltung´s old people, won’t have anyone to look after them, without adequate care and emotional support. Conversely, the State, when it is able, does not provide adequate care for old people. In instances where it does exist, it is characterized by aggressive, neglectful and rights-violating terms [41]. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to suppose that one possible scenario is the exponential growth of old people begging in the world, on street corners, begging for alms or driven mad by hunger, deprivation, heat or cold. Eliminated from the social landscape and increasingly invisibles. But paradoxically, they will be more visible, present and real than ever [42,43]. Those who are fortunate enough to have the resources will be able to hire immigrants to provide care. The majority will face a future of poverty and hardship. This represents a triumph of ageism without any awareness of ageism itself. The demographic shift towards an ageing population is a matter of significant concern, as evidenced by the prevalence of adverse age-related conditions [5]. This could also be expressed in terms that violence against older people will increasingly grow, perhaps as uncontrolled as it is clandestine [44,45]. And it is here that this other reality comes in: the progressive cessation of procreation, that is to say, the cessation of having children, appears in the form of the progressive and irreversible extinction of humanity. A situation that is so sensitive that it is not spoken or written about, even though doing so would generate a great deal of panic. Not one mentioned that an ageing society is also a society in which there is a decline in the number of children being born and in which the birth and replacement rate is decreasing. Lianos [46] and where we are approaching a reduced pleistocene clan that is similar to the original sapiens. From this standpoint, there is a possibility that we may face extinction as a result of realities associated with extreme and radical forms of cultural malaise [21,47]. At this juncture, the nullification and invisibility of the discomfort of a progressive extinction of humanity is being consolidated. We could tentatively call this the Völkermord-Spaltung (‘splitting-spaltung-of genocide’).

This Völkermord-Spaltung is a genocide that does not generate a social alert because it is never raised as such, revealing an intense and profound malaise in terms of a generation incapable of sustaining stable roles of fatherhood and motherhood, of projecting itself into the future and, therefore, incapable of sustaining ancestry, offspring and inheritance. Couples are choosing not to have children, or alternatively, have only one child, loaded with a terrifying messianic and narcissistic edge. I would like to make it clear that this is not a biological problem of gestation. This Völkermord-Spaltung is an unparalleled structure of generational arrest and paralysis [48]. The two figures proposed here (Älterwerden-Spaltung- Völkermord-Spaltung) also reveal the cultural fabric of a generation trapped in the unprecedented astonishment of what is done and not understood, the coercion to decide and the impossibility of stopping addictive behaviours, the imposition of reflection and the fact that a radical zwanglosigkeit (anguish of non-assignment) is imposed, related to a world in which nothing is understood any more. Nothing is named. Nothing can be explained anymore. And in which nobody asks questions anymore, let alone the necessary and pertinent questions [49,50]. Conversely, the current state of affairs remains unchanged. It is not possible to make changes. The instituted is a relentless and sadistic entity. And the rest are manic attempts, various selfie poses and multiple screens (of varying sizes) that have become the contemporary equivalent of the Ark of the Covenant in the XXI century. These further exacerbate feelings of abandonment and powerlessness [51]. As we have previously outlined, the ageing of society is not likely to result in a gerontocentric society. On the contrary. However, there will be a multitude of centenarians, a multitude of teenage grandparents who will be frightened by the possibility of a generational clash with their own grandparents and a multitude of overwhelmed parents unable to be parents or to be parents and enjoy it [52].

Psychopathology of the ageing society: Thanato- Mutations gesellschaft

We hereby propose the hypothesis that, to the extent that its situations are made invisible and are not focused on, made aware of and resolved them, the ageing society may become a society that is incapable and powerless to make the necessary changes, so that what should be semantised as a desired change becomes a feared scenario. Consequently, in the face of insurmountable difficulties or the feeling that action is futile, a sense of bewilderment and perplexity can emerge. In this way, the social stereotype surrounding the fear of imminent collapse [53].

In other words, since everything seems to indicate that there is a terrible resistance to accepting the ageing society and its dilemmas, it will also be impossible to understand that the changes that need to be imposed have to do with the ageing society [54,55]. Considering the level of denial and avoidance exhibited by the ageing society, the changes that will in any case result from it in 20, 30 or 60-years’ time will bring situations that will increase society’s confusion and bewilderment. We hereby propose the hypothesis of a form of cultural malaise that will manifest itself as a Thanato-Mutations gesellschaft, or a mutational-thanatological society. This mutational-thanatological society will become even more entrenched the less the unprecedented, bold and creative decisions that need to be taken (ever more urgently) in the face of an ageing society are made. It is evident that there is a prevailing sentiment of doubt, hesitation, ambiguity and denial. At the limit, we understand that this paralysis will lead to situations in which the sense of collapse will begin to unfold as a fearful and terrifying scene [56]. If in our society the great terror is the sensation of danger (of unemployment, pollution, violence, viruses, drugs, denunciations, immigrants), in the mutational-thanatological society the gravitational centre of terror will be between paralysis and the paralysis of the application of measures and laws which, nevertheless, will be inevitable. This is likely due to the fact that these measures are associated with what is currently deemed to be politically and socially unacceptable [57]. The ageing society must evolve beyond a mere demographic concept to become a tangible social reality, a transformation that is both desired and understood by individuals. This shift must be made visible, comprehensible and socially introjectable (in psychoanalytic terms) to truly resonate with the public. It will only acquire the status of reality once it is fully legitimised and recognised as such. This is not how it is perceived. Therefore, we maintain as a working hypothesis that its masking substitute will be implanted, the Thanato-Mutations gesellschaft, a mutational-thanatological society, the result of the pathological negation of the former.

In order to contribute to the debate on the subject, albeit not in a systematic manner, we could indicate that some of the relevant points of this mutational-thanatological society, in the face of which it is impossible to make adequate decisions, would include:
A. The failure of social policies to curb widespread impoverishment and the decline of the middle class, a class now devalued as the axis, centre and balance of the social scenario [58,59].
B. A predominance of situations involving widespread debt and indebtedness, in conjunction with widespread precariousness [60].
C. The impossibility to resolve the disparity between otherness and homogeneity; difference and similarity; minority rights and majority rule [61].
D. The breakdown of political parties as legitimate negotiators between democracy and citizen participation, coupled with a generation of politicians who lack boldness and the capacity for radical initiatives and so worried and frightened by the devastating and denunciatory viral-virtual opinion that they lose their ability to lead [62-64].
E. The emergence of new forms of participation, which no longer strictly fall under the umbrella of citizen participation. These forms appear to ignore, despise or disregard democratic processes. They are related to a new form of power based on the use of networks (with the complicity of the media) to manipulate, terrorize, censor, impose and dominate through the impunity of anonymous denunciation [65].
F. Consequently, democracy has lost its status as the leading model of social participation, often serving merely as a means for the renewal of authority. Hence the confusion and fluctuation between processes of deepening citizenship and others of disenfranchisement and de-citizenship. [66].
G. Profound and radical changes at the family level. The offspring, if they are to exist, will be an only child who will care for their parents for decades. However, this will be at best and the parents will die when the only child has become an old man himself. Furthermore, he will also take care of his grandparents and potentially even his great-grandparents, in the event of a scenario involving delayed death. Furthermore, it should be noted that the figures of the cousin, brother and uncle will become anachronistic. It is important to note that they will cease to exist [67-69].
H. Other changes are also in evidence, albeit to a lesser extent and more difficult to perceive. The traditional roles and functions of the family unit are becoming less clearly defined. Therefore, it is not clear whether the family is the place of child rearing and/or the place of affection. Conversely, situations of confusion and bitter reproaches become prevalent, related to an increasingly coercive presence of the state regulating the competences of parents. Within a structure of overwhelmed parents, parents no longer understand what their role or roles are and whether they are socially legitimized. At times, there is a sense that the traditional concept of ‘members’ has been superseded by that of ‘visitors’, leading to the development of a pathology of simulacra: a sense of being ‘as if’ we were part of the family unit. The family becomes an enigma to itself, just as paternal functions and prerogatives are denigrated, now considered anachronistic and dangerous. It could be argued that the most significant development is that the family moves from being at the very centre of the social structure to being a societal residue as a result of the development of the State [70- 73].
I. This confirms the transition from an adult-centred society to a nothing-centred society. There are no longer any clear or precise points of reference. The piercing ambiguity is accompanied by the neo-evangelical fundamentalist temptation to plunge society as a whole into the agony of confusion or the implementation of rigid, merciless, rigid and intolerant ideologies, where nothing can be discussed and where the other is an enemy [74-76].
J. At the same time, new forms of subjectivity are being established. It is important to note that these involve the complete breakdown of the psychic apparatus as a means of organising the mental and emotional world [77].
K. It is not possible to process thought without the ability to anticipate and react. The constant presence of doubt can also lead to an increase in thought, characterised by deep and often painful reflection, where every aspect is repeatedly examined and questioned: What is a couple? What is parenting? What is love? What are good parents? What are boundaries? What is family? How should we live? What should we live together like? What is work? What is oneself? [78].
L. It should be noted that none of this implies alienation in the traditional sense of lack of awareness. The dominance of confusing structures (which are no longer simply crises or traumas) means that when things happen, we no longer know how to deal with them properly. The sheer number of unsolvable problems is juxtaposed with a bewildering perplexity. At the same time, an estultophilic attitude is imposed, which is nothing more than the celebration of ignorance in the face of the impossibility of understanding (zwanglosigkeit mentioned above) what one is nevertheless aware of. As a result, neither culture nor knowledge are celebrated, but rather ignorance and ridiculousness [79,80].
M. The emergence of pathologies of transmission with deterioration of the figure of the ancestor (linked to a past which is now delegitimised) and of the heir (linked to a future which becomes ungraspable), with the consequence of a stopped inheritance, ‘encapsulated’ in its capacity to transmit. In other words, there is a transmission without heirs who recognise it as such. The allure of immediate gratification can be seen as a psychological defence mechanism against a past and future that are perceived as unalterable, unmanageable or inscrutable [81].
N. This inheritance without heirs implies that when transmission is exhausted, trial-and-error experiences begin to predominate. However, as trial-and-error experiences become more prevalent, society, the family, the object and the subject become increasingly fragile and disillusioned. The previously mentioned structure of overwhelmed parents corresponds to parents who neither have nor receive models of parenthood from a society that, for the first time in the history of humanity, does not have a model of what parents and parenthood are, unless the model is Homeric (from Homer Simpson’s cartoon), which is destined for parents to always end up appearing ridiculous, overwhelmed, always asking for forgiveness [82].

In summary, traditional modernity was a complex social agenda, where each element appeared to fit seamlessly together. The family was complementary to the couple, which in turn was complementary to personal biography, which was complementary to social performance, which in turn was complementary to the feeling of authenticity with oneself [83]. In this mutationalthanatological situation, the key pieces of the social and the political do not fit together but have to be squeezed and pressed together to make them fit. For instance, the politics of hyper-adaptation to the world of work disrupts the traditional home-work balance. There is a choice to be made between either remaining ‘faithful’ to the world of work or to the world of family. Either you are indebted to one, or you are indebted to the other [84]. The devices of the social agenda thus end up in conflict because each social space becomes absorbing and invasive. The social agenda thus becomes a bizarre puzzle, confronting impossible situations [85]. Therefore, then, the mutational-thanatological society implies a reconsideration of whether the figure of the bearer is annulled, that is, whether there is a subject who feels that he can or wants to contribute something of the social, just as the social can or wants to carry something of the subject; whether the figure of the underpinner is annulled, that is, whether the subject feels or wants to be represented in the groups and whether the groups feel represented in the subjects; finally, whether the figure of the guardian is annulled, that is, whether the subject wants or is able to look after or preserve the social as much as the social wants or is able to look after and preserve the subject [49].

The unanticipated demographic mutation

Conversely, we believe that the term ‘unanticipated demographic mutation’ is more precise than the conventional term ‘advanced demographic transition’. This unanticipated demographic shift encompasses not only the decline in the birth rate and population growth, but also the fact that the concept of old age is increasingly defined by ‘longevity’. The remarkable aspect of this ageing society is that we are witnessing processes that signal the onset of a new era of centenarians [86,87]. This means that the ageing society is one in which people are living longer than was previously thought possible. It is possible that they are not undergoing the process of ageing anymore; they are longevity processes of indefinitely postponed death. Along with the increasingly generalised phenomenon of old age, the low population replacement rate indicates that growth for the countries of the northern hemisphere can only be migratory. It is estimated that European countries, for example, require millions of migrants per year to maintain employment levels. Consequently, it is reasonable to conclude that future disputes between nations will not be over water, food or territory. They will be over people [88-91]. In an ageing society, the prediction is that unemployment will no longer be a concern (a shift from decades of neoliberal unemployment). However, there will be a significant impact on the social security deficit due to the loss of individuals paying social security contributions [92]. Is it time for the utopia of a humanity of open borders, free movement of people and free movement of persons? While this is undoubtedly the case, it is not a possibility. At the most inopportune moment, latent prejudices against foreigners resurface, making this essential migration impossible increasing the number of thanato-mutational situations [93]. At the same time, in a world with a limited population, the question arises as to who will contribute to the workforce. One potential solution is the involvement of old people. Or will it be the young or the very young? This is an illustrative example of something that is currently considered to be politically incorrect, as such situations may lead to a shift in the perception of younger generations. The issue of whether the figure of the adolescent will disappear and if we will transition from child to adult in order to legalise work situations is one that requires careful consideration. so will the age of majority be 14, for example? Therefore, if there is legality to work, will there be legality to marry, buy and sell property, among others, not to mention the right to vote [94,95].

What might this consensual genocide mean?

Let us consider what implications the declining population replacement rate might have. We acknowledge that this decision is of an unprecedented nature in human history. The decision not to have children has implications for a number of different relationships. Firstly, it means the elimination of the filial relationship, as well as the paternal-maternal, fraternal and generational relationships. It also means the elimination of the relationship to the heir and the inheritance. We are witnessing a consented, unnoticed, irreversible and complicit thanatic genocide. On the other hand, how can this kind of social ‘consent’ to one’s own extinction be understood? [96]. Is it possible to point out a common thread between the increasingly adverse social situations already mentioned and this apparent reluctance to proceed with pregnancy? In light of the current social landscape, which is characterised by exhaustion, scarcity and confusion and where demands continue to increase, would it be unreasonable to conclude that human beings feel that they have reached the limit of what is possible? In situations where submission, obedience, ‘behaving well’, effort, exhaustion and, indeed, the perception that nothing is enough or sufficient in the face of social demands, constant normative demands and perpetual identity constraints are present [97]. And all this in an increasingly fragmented and elusive panorama, where expert systems are being eradicated, living means going into debt and impoverishment to varying degrees is the general rule, where the predominance of an invasive culture, with no counterweight to the libidinal, the elaborate, the creative, leads to dead ends and policies that are always doomed to failure [98]. Is this, then, the limit of the exhaustion, patience and tolerance of the individual and collective subject, which, faced with the violence of a society stripped of its social contract, counters the violence (or “relief” or “revenge”) of its own annihilation? In other words, we must ask: does the collective subject become extinct by wishing to become extinct? [99]. The subject is sometimes treated as a citizen, sometimes as a noncitizen, sometimes as an unintegrable element and sometimes as a victim of massacre or exile (either physical or symbolic) and finally, others is regarded as an outsider, a stranger, or unrecognisable. We are thus faced with catastrophic situations, which mutate the social fabric in relation to a generalised de-contractualisation that makes the homeostatic maintenance of social, subjective and relational situations impossible. The results show that the situation is erratic, empty, indebted and always at fault [61,100].

In short, these are situations which, together with others of social neglect and abandonment, highlight features of violence which, to paraphrase Marcuse, involve moving from over-repression to over-violence, consolidated by an apparent indifference to the tears and dilemmas of the social fabric. This cultural shift is characterised by a marked tendency towards thanatism, which hinders the effective establishment of erotic bonds and the social contract that underpins traditional society [101-105]. It appears that the confusional, the thanatic and the precarious are elements that are increasingly present in societal, psychosocial and subjective spheres, generating disorganisation and vulnerability. The cultural ‘malaise’ of the past gave rise to symptoms, rebelliousness and a capacity for confrontation, if not revolutions and revolts. We can turn to the theories of Gramsci, Marx and Foucault to illustrate this point from a sociological perspective. Instead, today we are faced with a situation of increasingly widespread instituted, together with situations of stupor and hyper-adaptation. It is the precariousness of the precarious [106-112]. It is then worth asking whether we are dealing with a society that legitimises the confusing and the precarious in order to preserve itself. Could this be a unifying factor that might bring some rationality to this seemingly irrational situation? While a definitive answer is beyond the scope of this work, it would be beneficial to investigate and reflect on this societalism overwhelmed by stultophilia, the denunciation of everyone and everything, the breakdown of hierarchy and authority, the bewilderment, the plundering fears and the impossibility of managing and negotiating a social fabric that is increasingly scarce, as well as implacable, severe and exhausting [113-115]. However, this is not the first instance of a race of hominids becoming extinct. It is important to note that Homo Neanderthal existed approximately 200,000 years ago and became extinct between 40,000 and 30,000 years ago, following a period of coexistence with Homo sapiens that lasted for around 5,000 years… As with contemporary Homo sapiens, the population of Neanderthals began to stabilise after a sharp increase, which is estimated to have peaked at around 7,000 individuals in Europe. The explanation for this decline is that the environment changed, that humans stole their resources, or massacred them, or ate them, or hybridised with them [116].

But what if the reality were different? What if the Neanderthal lost the will to live? What if his hominid rival was to him what this thanatic society is to the current subject: a brutal imposition of confusion that makes one fall irrevocably into malaise, unease, the melancholy that whatever one does is ultimately lost, absurd or bizarre? And what if he felt that no matter what he did, everything was finally lost, absurd or grotesque? In summary, the violent and coercive imposition (equivalent to the Konzentrationslager, the concentration camp) that destroys hope, the will to live, the joy for one’s descendants, the narcissistic protection that comes from inheritance and generational transmission and the descent into the melancholy of zero and extinction [117,118]. This is a culture of death that most people would not openly acknowledge, but its consequences are already evident and we are all, through our silence, complicit..

The present study will consider the implications of perceiving ageing or an ageing society as a ‘problem’, instead embrace the imminent and irreversible reality of an ageing society. This necessitates a concerted effort to prepare the optimal conditions for the arrival of this era. It is important to note that this does not imply a direct engagement with older adults; rather, it signifies an involvement with the children, grandchildren and neighbours of these older adults. This involves collaborating with various stakeholders, including adults, young people, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), professionals, technicians, the State and various civil and religious organisations. The objective is to elucidate and disseminate the concept of an ageing society and its implications, with a particular focus on the centenarian society [119]. The most valuable lesson to be learned from the situation that has arisen in the wake of the covid pandemic is that demographic trends, survival expectations and evolving cultural and identity climates alone are insufficient to ensure acceptance of the reality and implications of an ageing society [120]. We therefore recommend a comprehensive, interdisciplinary action plan that targets individuals, collectives, governments and states [121]. It is not merely a matter of proposing such policies; rather, it is imperative to vigorously advocate for the implementation of policies (and, where feasible, constitutional policies) that are in alignment with a collective vision for the future and that are meticulously delineated to ensure precise objectives. This operational awareness-raising action must be accompanied by strong positioning on social media, in the streets and perhaps even in various types of mobilisations [122-125]. It is therefore suggested that progress related to the ageing society is, at the same time, inseparable from raising awareness about the role of scapegoats that old persons occupy in the current social structure. This is indicative of the fact that they function less as an age group and more as a stigmatised group, within which emotions and ghosts are deposited that fall into the category of the unthinkable, the unspeakable, the socially unnameable. This is due to the threat of helplessness, panic and anxiety that is experienced by the entire society [126,127].

As mentioned at the beginning of this article the purpose of these reflexions is to contribute to the debate on ageing society, its meaning and its decisive impact in social, cultural, political and other terms. Unfortunately, there is still very little written about it in the specialised literature. This particular article certainly addresses uncomfortable and controversial aspects of the society in which we live and also about ageing society. Notwithstanding the potential for misunderstandings and the emergence of potential disagreements, it is nevertheless believed that the exposure of these realities is a risk that is justifiable. The contemporary cultural trend, which, under the guise of political correctness, casts a menacing shadow over our critical and emancipatory capacity for thought, should not result in our complacency or indifference to the ethics of scientific inquiry or the dilemmas that emerge in the 21st century and in the centuries to come [128].

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