Abstract

On October 26, 2004 the Knesset, Israel’s Parliament, approved the disengagement plan, a unilateral plan to evacuate all the Jewish communities in the Jewish settlement bloc in the Gaza Strip (popularly known as Gush K) and four communities in northern Samaria, on the West Bank. In 2005 the State of Israel embarked on a national mission to find suitable solutions for the evacuees who were forced to leave their homes and communities. The implementation began on August 15, 2005, when over 8,000 people were evacuated in only eight days. Since then, many and varied government-bureaucratic organizations have been working to carry out the abovementioned “national mission,” but according to the State Comptroller’s report, they have been working too slowly. The report also noted that the Jewish residents of Gaza Strip experienced “expulsion.” [1]. At the time of this writing, only about 22 percent of the evacuees are living in their new homes, and 33 percent have yet to begin construction [2].
To date there has been no in-depth examination of the specific issue of how the bureaucracy handled the traumatic evacuation of the Gaza Strip cemetery. Even the State Commission of Inquiry into the Handling by the Authorized Authorities of the Evacuees from Gush K and Northern Samaria (hereonin: The Commission of Inquiry) did not discuss the issue. In this article we will examine whether the Israeli authorities attempted to demonstrate flexibility during the evacuation of the graves and following the disengagement, and whether the solutions considered the needs and demands of the families of the deceased [3]. We will compare the term “national mission” as it was used by government leaders to expedite the bureaucratic treatment of the Gush K residents, with the actual situation on the ground. We found that in evacuating the graves the Israeli bureaucracy failed to demonstrate the necessary sensitivity and flexibility [4-8].